NIETZSCHE, FREUD, MARX* | MICHEL FOUCAULT

| sexta-feira, 23 de outubro de 2009
hiS project of a "round table," when it was proposed to me,
seemed very interesting but obviously rather imposing. I suggest an
expedient: some themes concerning the techniques oj interpretation of
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.




NIETZSCHE, FREUD, MARX*
ThiS project of a "round table," when it was proposed to me,
seemed very interesting but obviously rather imposing. I suggest an
expedient: some themes concerning the techniques oj interpretation of
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.
In reality, behind these themes, there is a dream: to be able one day
to compile a kind of general corpus, an encyclopedia of all the techniques
of interpretation that we have come to know from the Greek
grammarians to our own day. I believe that, until now, few chapters of
this great corpus of all the techniques of interpretation have been
edited.
It seems to me that it would be possible, by way of general introduction
to this idea of a history of the techniques of interpretation, to
say this: Language-in any case, language in the Indo-European
cultures-has always given birth to two kinds of suspicions:
• First of all, the suspicion that language does not mean exactly
what it says. The meaning that one grasps, and that is immediately
manifest, is perhaps in reality only a lesser meaning that
protects, confines, and yet in spite of everything transmits another
meaning, the latter being at once the stronger meaning and the
"underlying" meaning. This is what the Greeks called allegoria
and huponoia.
'This essay originally appeared in Cahiers de Royaumont (Paris: Minuit, 1967), vol. 4:
NietzJche, pp. 185-~OO. It stems from the July 1964 Royaumont colloquium. This translation,
by Jon Anderson and Gary Hentzi, has been slightly amended.
270 Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology
• On the other hand, language gives birth to this other suspicion: It
exceeds its merely verbal form in some way, and there are indeed
other things in the world which speak and which are not language.
After all, it could be that nature, the sea, the rustling of
trees, animals, faces, masks, crossed swords, all of these speak;
perhaps there is language that articulates its elfin a manner that is
not verbal. This would be, if you like, very roughly, the Greek's
semainon.
These two suspicions, which one sees already appearing with the
Greeks, have not disappeared, and they are still with us, since we
have once again begun to believe, specifically since the nineteenth
century, that mute gestures, that illnesses, that all the tumult around
us can also speak; and more than ever we are listening in on all this
possible language, trying to intercept, beneath the words, a discourse
that would be more essential.
I believe that each culture-I mean to say each cultural form in
Western civilization - has had its system of interpretation, its techniques,
its methods, its own ways of suspecting that language means
something other than what it says, and of suspecting that there is
language other than in language. It seems, then, that one could inaugurate
the enterprise of making the system, or the "table," as they
used to say in the seventeenth century, of all these systems of interpretation.
In order to understand what system of interpretation the nineteenth
century founded, and so in turn what system of interpretation
we, too, even now are involved in, it seems to me necessary to take a
remote reference point, a type of technique that could exist, for example,
in the sixteenth century. In that period, what provided a place
for interpretation, both its general site and the minimal unity that
interpretation had to maintain, was resemblance. Whenever things
resembled each other, wherever that was similar, something wanted
to be said and could be deciphered; the important role that resemblance,
and all the notions that revolve around it like satellites, played
in the cosmology, in the botany, in the zoology, in the philosophy of
the sixteenth century is well known. Actually, to twentieth-century
eyes, this whole network of similitudes is rather confused and
tangled. In fact, the corpus of resemblance in the sixteenth century
Nietzsche, Freud, Marx 271
was perfectly organized. There were at least five perfectly defined
notions:
• The notion of conformability, convenientia, which is adjustment
(for example, of the soul to the body, or of the animal series to the
vegetable series).
• The notion of sympatheia, sympathy, which is the identity of accidents
in distinct substances.
• The notion of emulatio, which is the very curious parallelism of
attributes in distinct substances or beings, such that the attributes
of one are like the reflections of those of another. (Thus Porta
explains that the human face is, with its seven distinguishable
parts, the emulation of the sky with its seven planets.)
• The notion of signatura, signature, which is, among the visible
properties of an individual, the image of an invisible and hidden
property.
• And then, of course, the notion of analogy, which is the identity of
relations between two or more distinct substances.
In this period, then, the theory of the sign and the techniques of
interpretation were based on a perfectly clear definition of all the possible
types of resemblance, and they formed the basis of two perfectly
distinct types of knowledge: cognitio, which was the transition, in
some lateral fashion, from one resemblance to another; and divinatio,
which was knowledge in depth, going from a superficial resemblance
to a deeper resemblance. All these resemblances manifest the consensus
of the world that grounds them; they are opposed to the simulacrum,
the false resemblance, which is based on the dissension
between God and the Devil.
If these sixteenth-century techniques of interpretation were left in
suspension by the evolution of Western thought in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, if the Baconian critique, the Cartesian critique
of resemblance certainly played a major role in bracketing
them, the nineteenth century-and particularly Marx, Nietzsche, and
}freud - have put us back into the presence of a new possibility of
II I
272 Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology
interpretation; they have founded once again the possibility of a
hermeneutic.
The first volume of Capita~ texts like The Birth oj Tragedy and The
Genealogy oj Morals, and The Interpretation oj Dreams, put us back
into the presence of interpretive techniques. And the shock effect, the
kind of wound caused in Western thought by these works, probably
comes from what they reconstituted before our eyes, something,
moreover, that Marx himself called "hieroglyphs." This has put us
into an uncomfortable position, since these techniques of interpretation
concern us ourselves, since we, the interpreters, have begun to
interpret ourselves by these techniques. With these techniques of interpretation,
in turn, we must interrogate those interpreters who were
Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx, so that we are perpetually sent back in a
perpetual play of mirrors.
Freud says somewhere that there are three great narcissistic
wounds in Western culture:1 the wound inflicted by Copernicus; the
one made by Darwin, when he discovered that man descended from
the ape; and the wound made by Freud himself, when he in turn
discovered that consciousness rests on the unconscious. I wonder
whether one could not say that Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx, by involving
us in a task of interpretation that always reflects back on itself,
have not constituted around us, and for us, these mirrors in which we
are given back images whose perennial wounds form our narcissism
today. In any case-and it is to this end that I would like to make some
suggestions-it seems to me that Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud have not
in some way multiplied the signs in the Western world. They have not
given a new meaning to things that had no meaning. They have in
reality changed the nature of the sign and modified the fashion in
which the sign can in general be interpreted.
The first question that I wanted to pose is this: Have not Marx,
Freud, and Nietzsche profoundly modified the space of distribution in
which signs can be signs?
In the period that I have taken as a point of reference, in the sixteenth
century, signs were disposed in a homogeneous fashion in a
space that was itself homogeneous in all directions. The signs of the
earth referred to the sky, but they referred to the subterranean world
as well; they referred from man to animal, from animal to plant, and
reciprocally. Beginning in the nineteenth century, with Freud, Marx,
and Nietzsche, signs were ranged in a much more differentiated
space, according to a dimension that could be called that of depth
Nietzsche, Freud, Marx 275
[projondeur), as long as this is not taken to mean interiority, but on the
contrary exteriority.
I think in particular of the long debate that Nietzsche never ceased
to carry on with depth. There is in Nietzsche a critique of ideal depth,
of depth of conscience, which he denounces as an invention of philosophers;
this depth would be the pure and interior search for truth.
Nietzsche shows how it implies resignation, hypocrisy, the mask; so
that the interpreter must, when he examines signs in order to denounce
them, descend along the vertical line and show that this depth
of interiority is in reality something other than what it says. Consequently,
it is necessary that the interpreter descend, that he be, as
Nietzsche says, "the good excavator of the lower depths.,,2
But, in reality, when one interprets one can trace this descending
line only to restore the glittering exteriority that was covered up and
buried. For if the interpreter must go to the bottom himself, like an
excavator, the movement of interpretation is, on the contrary, that ofa
projection [swplomb), of a more and more elevated projection, which
always leaves depth above it to be displayed in a more and more
visible fashion; and depth is now restored as an absolutely superficial
secret, in such a way that the flight of the eagle, the ascension of the
mountain, all the verticality that is so important in Zarathustra is in
the strict sense the reversal of depth, the discovery that depth was
only a game and a surface fold. To the extent that the world becomes
deeper under our gaze, we perceive that everything which elicited
man's depth was only child's play.
I wonder whether this spatiality, this game with depth of Nietzsche's
spatiality cannot be compared to the apparently different
game that Marx carried on with platitude. The concept of platitude in
Marx is very important; at the beginning of Capita~ he explains how,
unlike Perseus, he must plunge into the fog to show that, in fact, there
are no monsters or profound enigmas, because everything profound
in the conception that the bourgeoisie has of money, capital, value,
and so on, is in reality nothing but platitude.
And, of course, it would be necessary to recall the space of interpretation
that Freud constituted, not only in the famous topology of consciousness
and the unconscious, but equally in the rules that he
formulated for psychoanalytic treatment, and the analyst's deciphering
of what is said in the course of the spoken "chain." It would be
necessary to recall the spatiality, very material after all, to which
II
Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology
Freud attached such importance and which lays out the patient under
the overhanging gaze [regard surplombant] of the psychoanalyst
The second theme-which I would like to propose to you is, moreover,
somewhat related to the first-is to point out that, beginning with the
three men of whom we are now speaking, interpretation has at last
become an infinite task.
In truth, it already was in the sixteenth century, but signs referred
[se renvoyaienq to each other quite simply because resemblance can
only be limited. Beginning in the nineteenth century, signs are linked
together in an inexhaustible network, itself also infinite, not because
they are based on a resemblance without borders but because there is
irreducible gaping and openness.
The incompleteness of interpretation, the fact that it is always lacerated
and that it remains suspended on its own brink, is found once
again, I believe, in a somewhat analogous fashion in Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud in the form of the refusal of beginning. Refusal of the "Robinsonade,"
said Marx; a distinction, so important in Nietzsche, between
the beginning and the origin; and the always-incomplete
character of the regressive and analytic process in Freud. It is, above
all, in Nietzsche and Freud, moreover, and to a lesser degree in Marx,
that one sees delineated this experience, which I believe so important
to modern hermeneutics: the farther one goes in interpretation, the
closer one comes at the same time to an absolutely dangerous region
where interpretation not only will find its point of return but where it
will disappear as interpretation, perhaps involving the disappearance
of the interpreter himself. The existence that always approached the
absolute point of interpretation would be at the same time that of a
point of rupture.
It is well known how, in Freud, the discovery of this structurally
open, structurally gaping character of interpretation was progressively
made. It was made first in a very allusive manner, quite veiled
by itself, in The Interpretation oj Dreams, when Freud analyzes his
own dreams and invokes reasons of modesty or of nondisclosure of a
personal secret in order to interrupt himself.
In the analysis of Dora, the idea appears that interpretation must
indeed be halted, not be allowed to go through to the end in consideration
of something that will be called "transference" some years later.
Furthermore, the inexhaustibility of analysis asserts itself across the
entire study of transference in the infinite and infmitely problematic
Nietzsche, Freud, Marx 275
character of the relationship of analysand to analyst, a relationship
that is clearly constitutive for psychoanalysis, which opens the space
in. which psychoanalysis never ceases to deploy itself without ever
being able to complete itself.
In Nietzsche, too, it is clear that interpretation is always incomplete.
What is philosophy for him ifnot a kind of philology continually
in suspension, a philology without end, always farther unrolled, a
philology that would never be absolutely fixed? Why? As he says in
Beyond Good and Evil, it is because "to perish from absolute knowledge
could well form part of the basis of being."3 And yet he has
shown in Ecce homo how near he was to this absolute knowledge that
forms part of the basis of Being. Likewise, in the course of the autumn
of 1888 at Thrin.
If in Freud's correspondence one deciphers his perpetual worries
from the moment that he discovered psychoanalysis, one can wonder
whether Freud's experience is not, after all, rather similar to that of
Nietzsche. What is in question in the point of rupture ofinterpretation,
in this convergence of interpretation on a point that renders it impossible,
could well be something like the experience of madness.
An experience against which Nietzsche fought and by which he
was fascinated; an experience against which Freud himself struggled,
not without anguish, all of his life. This experience of madness would
be the sanction of a movement of interpretation that approaches its
center at infinity and that collapses, charred.
This essential incompleteness of interpretation is, I believe, linked to
two other principles, also fundamental, which would constitute, with
the first two of which I have just spoken, the postulates of modern
hermeneutics. First of all, if interpretation can never be completed,
this is quite simply because there is nothing to interpret There is
nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all everything is already
interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself
to interpretation but an interpretation of other signs.
There is never, if you like, an interpretandum that is not already
interpretans, so that it is as much a relationship of violence as of elucidation
that is established in interpretation. Indeed, interpretation does
not clarifY a matter to be interpreted, which offers itself passively; it
can only seize, and violently, an already-present interpretation, which
it must overthrow, upset, shatter with the blows of a hammer.
Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology
One sees this already in Marx, who interprets not the history of the
relations of production but a relation already offering itself as an interpretation,
since it appears as nature. Likewise, Freud interprets not
signs but interpretations. Indeed, what does Freud discover beneath
symptoms? He does not discover, as is said, "traumas"; he brings to
light phantasms with their burden of anguish, that is, a kernel that is
itself already in its own being an interpretation. Anorexia, for example,
does not refer to weaning, as the signifier refers to the signified;
rather, anorexia, as a sign, a symptom to be interpreted, refers to
phantasms of the bad maternal breast, which is itself an interpretation,
which is already in itself a speaking body. This is why Freud has
nothing to interpret other than what in the language of his patients is
offered to him as symptoms; his interpretation is the interpretation of
an interpretation, in the terms in which this interpretation is given. It
is well known that Freud invented the "superego" [surmoi] the day
that a patient said to him: "I feel a dog over me" ["je sens un chien sur
moi"].
In the same manner, Nietzsche seizes interpretations that have already
seized each other. For Nietzsche, there is no original signified.
Words themselves are nothing but interpretations, throughout their
history they interpret before being signs, and ultimately they signify
only because they are essentially nothing but interpretations. Witness
the famous etymology of agathos.4 This is also what Nietzsche means
when he says that words have always been invented by the ruling
classes; they do not denote a signified, they impose an interpretation.
Consequently, it is not because there are primary and enigmatic signs
that we are now dedicated to the task of interpreting but because
there are interpretations, because there is always the great tissue of
violent interpretations beneath everything that speaks. It is for this
reason that there are signs, signs that prescribe to us the interpretation
of their interpretation, that enjoin us to overturn them as signs. In
this sense one can say that allegoria and huponoia are at the bottom of
language and before it, not just what slipped after the fact from beneath
words in order to displace them and make them vibrate but
what gave birth to words, what makes them glitter with a luster that is
never fixed. This is also why the interpreter, for Nietzsche, is the "authentic
one"; he is the "true one," not just because he seizes a sleeping
truth in order to proclaim it but because he pronounces the interpretation
that all truth functions to cover up. Perhaps this primacy of
Nietzsche, Freud, Marx
interpretation with respect to signs is what is most decisive in modern
hermeneutics.
The idea that interpretation precedes the sign implies that the sign
is not a simple and benevolent being, as was still the case in the
sixteenth century, when the plethora of signs, the fact that things resembled
each other, simply proved the benevolence of God and separated
the sign from the signifier by only a transparent veil. On the
contrary, beginning with the nineteenth century, beginning with
Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche, it seems to me that the sign becomes
malevolent; I mean that there is in the sign an ambiguous and somewhat
suspicious form of ill will and "malice" ["malveiller']. And this is
to the extent that the sign is already an interpretation that does not
appear as such. Signs are interpretations that try to justify themselves,
and not the reverse.
Thus money functions in the way that one sees it defined in the
Critique qf Political Economy and above all in the first volume of
Capital. Thus symptoms function in Freud. And in Nietzsche, words,
justice, binary classifications of Good and Evil, and consequently
signs, are masks. In acquiring this new function of covering up interpretation,
the sign loses its simple signifying being, which is still possessed
in the Renaissance; its own density comes as though to open
itself up, and all the negative concepts that had until then remained
foreign to the theory of the sign can hurl themselves into the opening.
The theory of the sign knew only the transparent and scarcely negative
moment of the veil. Now a whole play of negative concepts, of
contradictions, of oppositions, in short, the whole play of reactive
forces that Deleuze has analyzed so well in his book on Nietzsche will
be able to organize itself in the interior of the sign.
"To stand the dialectic back on its feet": if this expression must
have a meaning, would it not be precisely to have put back into the
density of the sign, into this open space, without end, gaping, into this
space without real content or reconciliation, all this play of negativity
that the dialectic, at last, had unleashed by giving it a positive meaning?
Finally, the last characteristic of hermeneutics: interpretation finds
itself with the obligation to interpret itself to infmity, always to resume.
From which, two important consequences. The first is that interpretation
will henceforth always be interpretation by ''whom?''
Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology
One does not interpret what is in the signified, but one interprets after
all: who posed the interpretation. The basis of interpretation is nothing
but the interpreter, and this is perhaps the meaning that Nietzsche
gave to the word "psychology." The second consequence is that inter-pretation
must always interpret itself and cannot fail to turn back on
itself. In opposition to the time of signs, which is a time of definite
terms [l'echeance], and in opposition to the time of dialectic, which is
linear in spite of everything, there is a time of interpretation, which is
circular. This time is obliged to go back over where it has already
been, which after all constitutes the only risk that interpretation really
runs-but it is a supreme risk, which signs paradoxically cause it to
run. The death of interpretation is to believe that there are signs, signs
that exist primarily, originally, actually, as coherent, pertinent, and
systematic marks.
The life of interpretation, on the contrary, is to believe that there are
only interpretations. It seems to me necessary to understand what too
many of our contemporaries forget, that hermeneutics and semiology
are two fierce enemies. A hermeneutic that in effect falls back on a
semiology believes in the absolute existence of signs: it abandons the
violence, the incompleteness, the infinity of interpretations in order to
enthrone the terror of the index or to suspect language. Here we recognize
Marxism after Marx. On the contrary, a hermeneutic that
wraps itself in itself enters the domain of languages which do not
cease to implicate themselves, that intermediate region of madness
and pure language. It is there that we recognize Nietzsche.
NOTES
I See Sigmund Freud, "Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse" ["One of the Difficulties of Psychoanalysis"
(1917), in Sigmund Freud; Collected Papers, ed. Ernest Jones, trans. Joan Riviere,
(London: Hogarth Press,I905), pp. M7-56)].
~ See Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenr'Othe (Leipzig: Naumann ISSI [The Dawn qf D~ trans. J. M.
Kennedy, in The Complete Work& qf FrW1rich Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy, vol. 9 (London: Foulls,
1911), p. ~30].
5 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und B~se (Leipzig: Nauman, 1SS6) (Beyond Good and
Evil, in The Complete Works qf FrWJrich Nietzsche, vol. 12, ed. Oscar Levy, trans. Helen Zimmern
(London: FouUs; 1911), pp. M-M].
4 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral (Leipzig: Naumann, 1SS7) [On the Genealo/!y
qf Morah, in Basic Writill8l qf NieWche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmano (New York: Modern
Library, IgSS), pp. 4-5].

Pesquisar este blog

Carregando...
arte (407) pintura (248) filosofia (102) fotografia (89) literatura (84) psicanálise (57) morte (37) HQ (28) freud (28) peanuts (27) skull (27) antropologia (26) comic (24) poesia (23) lacan (22) PSYCHOANALYSIS (20) Desenho (17) Picasso (15) o seminário (15) Bresson (13) cat (12) oriente (12) borges (11) kant (11) psicologia (11) foucault (10) levi-strauss (10) platão (10) SONHOS (9) religião (9) Kirchner (8) biografia (8) kafka (8) love (8) Ernest Max (7) Guimaraes Rosa (7) Ken Rosenthal (7) Mark Eshbaugh (7) NIETZSCHE (6) Salvador Dali (6) aristóteles (6) manet (6) snoopy (6) sociologia (6) Animais (5) Aristotle (5) Escher (5) Geertz (5) Hundertwasser (5) Lauren Simonutti (5) Sommer (5) medicina (5) munch (5) Arthur DOVE (4) CINEMA (4) Carl LARSSON (4) Cézanne (4) DICIONARIO (4) Descartes (4) Doré (4) Ernest Jones (4) Ernst HAAS (4) Guido Crepax (4) H. Bergson (4) Julio Cortázar (4) Kacere (4) Locke (4) Mucha (4) Richter (4) Van Gogh (4) Will Barnet (4) alexandre koyrè (4) caveira (4) drummond (4) gravura (4) hegel (4) história (4) linguística (4) monet (4) música (4) sartre (4) teatro (4) televisão (4) universo (4) verdade (4) Abbas (3) Arthur Rackham (3) Avigdor (3) Blake (3) CORINTH (3) Cambon (3) Connie Imboden (3) David Hockney (3) F. Hodler (3) Frida KAHLO (3) GEORGES BATAILLE (3) James Joyce (3) Kojeve (3) Konrad LORENZ (3) Lori Nix (3) M. J. A. Eguiño (3) Marcel MAUSS (3) Marqués de Sade (3) Marx (3) Memling (3) Pierre Bourdieu (3) Psychiatry (3) SENECA (3) Schopenhauer (3) Tom Chambers (3) Winnicott (3) arroyo (3) autobiografia (3) baby (3) caravaggio (3) cristianismo (3) dickens (3) einstein (3) erwitt (3) etologia (3) fisica (3) magia (3) planetas (3) B. F. Skinner (2) BACHELARD (2) Birman J. (2) CERVANTES (2) Castillo (2) Dix (2) Dulac (2) E. HOPPER (2) E. Nodel (2) ETNOLOGÍA (2) Ernest HAAS (2) Ferenczi (2) G. JOHN (2) GEORGE CANGUILHEM (2) Gustav Caillebotte (2) Hipocrates (2) J. Ensor (2) J. J. Tissot (2) JUNG (2) John Donne (2) KARL JASPERS (2) KIERKEGAARD (2) Kandinsky (2) Klimt (2) L. da VINCI (2) LOUIS ALTHUSSER (2) Lewis Carroll (2) M. Dzama (2) MAUGHAM (2) MERLEAU - PONTY (2) Mann (2) Melanie Klein (2) Neil Welliver (2) Norman Rockwell (2) Pascal (2) Piaget (2) Pollock (2) Quino (2) Roland Barthes (2) Sahlins (2) Serge Leclaire (2) St. Agostinho (2) Stratton (2) Vinicus de Moraes (2) Vuillard (2) WITTGENSTEIN (2) amor (2) beauvoir (2) biology (2) cogito (2) critica (2) cultura (2) diabo (2) erotic (2) estruturalismo (2) gide (2) guerra (2) loucura (2) lua (2) mind (2) mitologia (2) mitos (2) rilke (2) salomão (2) saturno (2) sono (2) sócrates (2) vida (2) ética (2) A. Comte (1) A. Warhol (1) Alix Malka (1) Andreas Gursky (1) Anticristo (1) Arcimboldo (1) Aristófanes (1) Augusto dos Anjos (1) B. Barbey (1) B. Jacklin (1) Bagheria (1) Barbara Morgan (1) Basquiat (1) Berkeley (1) Bhagavad-Gita (1) Bhopal (1) Bocklin (1) Bouguereau (1) Brauner (1) Bruegel (1) Brueghel (1) Brueguel (1) Burt GLINN (1) CALOUSTE GULBENKIAN (1) CAZOTTE (1) CRVANTES (1) Charles S. Peirce (1) Chavannes (1) China (1) Claesz (1) Confucius (1) Confúncio (1) D. (1) DAVIS Stuart (1) DEGAS (1) DELACROIX (1) Dalton Trevisan (1) Deleuze (1) Denis (1) Design (1) Diebenkorn (1) Diógenes (1) E. (1) ERNST CASSIRER (1) Emile Durkheim (1) Empédocles (1) Epimenides (1) F. Vallotton (1) FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE (1) Feuerbach (1) Feyerabend (1) Florbela Espanca (1) Franceco Clemente (1) Franz Marc (1) GROOT (1) GUSTON (1) Galileu (1) Gestalt (1) Graham (1) Grécia (1) Guercino (1) H. Arendt (1) H. MARCUSE (1) Hals (1) Helmut Newton (1) Holbien (1) Hume (1) J. Derrida (1) J.-F. Millet (1) Jan Van KESSEL (1) Jean Laplanche (1) KROYER (1) Kandel E. (1) Keane (1) Kim (1) Kitaoka (1) Klee (1) Knight (1) Korand Von SOEST (1) Kôhler (1) Liev Tolstói (1) M. Mead (1) Malinowski (1) Mantegna (1) Mark Petrick (1) Max Weber (1) Mário Quintana (1) Münter (1) N. Chomsky (1) NEIL GAIMAN (1) Nasio (1) Otto Rank (1) Ovídio (1) Palencia (1) Parmênides (1) Paul DELVAUX (1) Peter HILLE (1) Raduan Nassar (1) Ron Van Dongen (1) S. Franklin (1) Sandman (1) Satrapi (1) Schiele (1) Shakespeare (1) Silvers (1) Siqueiros (1) Spinoza (1) St. T. de Aquino (1) TELEPATIA (1) TODOROV (1) Tarsila do Amaral (1) Taschen (1) Thomas HOPKER (1) Truffaut (1) Tycho (1) Uccello (1) Velvet underground Nico (1) Verne (1) Victor Brochard (1) W. Metcalf (1) Web (1) Weinberg (1) William Bailey (1) Woody Allen (1) Xenofonte (1) Y. Utagawa (1) Yoshitoshi (1) alessandro gottardo (1) arcoiris (1) armour (1) arquitetura (1) asselyn (1) ate (1) bassano (1) biblia (1) breton (1) cartoon (1) ceticismo (1) cocaina (1) conto (1) criança (1) dança (1) direito (1) dor (1) eclesiastes (1) economia (1) edgar allan poe (1) edgar morin (1) ego (1) ensaio (1) epicurus (1) espelho (1) estações (1) eu (1) fala (1) feed (1) foto (1) frr (1) física (1) game (1) gato (1) giger (1) girafa (1) goya (1) hamlet (1) hoffmann (1) humor (1) identificação (1) impressionismo (1) intuição (1) jakobson (1) japan (1) krsna (1) kundera (1) lacn (1) leminski (1) lévi-strauss (1) mafalda (1) magritte (1) miró (1) moda (1) moral (1) mundo (1) mãe (1) narrativa (1) nausea (1) neruda (1) nokides (1) ocultismo (1) perguntas (1) poeso (1) poker (1) política (1) praia (1) sabedoria (1) sapatos (1) saramago (1) semina (1) semiótica (1) shopenhauer (1) soutine (1) suicidio (1) swan (1) sêneca (1) tatoo (1) tatuagem (1) tese (1) titã (1) touro (1) umberto eco (1) valentina (1) venus (1) virtude (1) war (1) weeks (1)
 

sobrefulanos by nokides